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THE MALLEABILITY OF EYEWITNESSES: INVESTIGATING 
THE EXTERNAL PREDICTORS FOR EYEWITNESS 
SUGGESTIBILITY
Are eyewitnesses reliable?
In approximately 48% 
of cases of 
misidentification, the 
real perpetrator 
went on to commit 
more crimes
Cardozo, (2009); Scheck, Nuefeld, Dwyer (2003)
Oklahoma Bombing (1995)
Timothy McVeigh
Oklahoma Bombing (1995)
 Three eyewitnesses had seen the suspect (Timothy McVeigh) 
come into the store they worked at to rent a truck (which was 
later used for the attack). 
 Initially, two of the witnesses had reported only seeing McVeigh 
inside the truck; the third witness had mistakenly believed that a 
second accomplice was also present with McVeigh. 
 After discussing the event with each other, all three witnesses 
had become convinced that a second accomplice was present 
during the event (Memon & Wright, 1999; Schacter, 2001).
 The collaborative error caused police officers to exhaust their 
time and resources looking for a non-existent second suspect 
(Skagerberg & Wright, 2008).
Co-witness discussions
• 86% of real eyewitnesses discuss the 
event with co-witnesses, prior to giving 
a statement 
• 38% of misidentification cases involved 
multiple eyewitnesses making a false 
statement.
(Paterson & Kemp, 2006a)
The misinformation paradigm
• Participants are paired with a 
confederate and asked to view an 
incident via a video or slideshow of 
pictures depicting the event. 
• Sometime after, participants are asked to 
discuss the event with their ‘co-witness’ 
(confederate). The confederate will have 
been previously instructed to present 
false information about the event.
• Finally, the participants are individually 
questioned by the interviewer about the 
witnessed event. 
Co-witness influence
• A large body of research (see Garry et al., 2008; 
Paterson & Kemp, 2006b) suggests that 
eyewitnesses can be influenced by co-witnesses 
into recalling false information from an event.
• More worryingly, Thorley (2015) demonstrated 
that eyewitnesses could be misled by co-
witnesses into attributing blame onto an 
innocent bystander. A phenomenon referred to 
as blame conformity.
(French, Sutherland, & Garry, 2008; Gabbert et al., 2004; Garry et al., 2008 ; Paterson & Kemp, 2006b; Thorley, 2015)
Social influence
The act of changing ones own attitudes, beliefs or behaviour to match that of a person or 
groups (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004)
Different forms of Influence
Limitations of the previous research
• The majority of the research on co-witness influence has typically studied 
the effects of post-event discussions on eyewitness pairs, where the 
misinformation was presented by one person.
• However, during real criminal events, there will often be more than two 
eyewitnesses present (Memon, Dalton, Horry, Milne, Wright, 2016; 
Paterson & Kemp, 2006b; Skagerberg & Wright, 2008b).
• Bond (2005) highlighted the significance of the unanimity of 
misinformation and misinformation size in moderating the level of social 
influence an individual will be subjected to.
Misinformation size
• Research on conformity suggests that social influence is greater when 
presented by a larger group of individuals (Asch, 1955; Campbell & 
Fairey, 1989; Gerard, Wilhelmy, & Conolley, 1968; Rosenberg, 1961; 
Stang, 1976). 
• Walther et al., (2002) investigated the relationship between group 
size (five versus ten) and memory conformity. Their results suggested 
that misinformation was more influential when presented by the 
larger groups.  
Unanimity of Misinformation 
• Theories on informational influence suggest that for misinformation to 
have a significant influence on the target, it must also be unanimously held 
by the group (Asch, 1955; Baron, Vandello & Brunsman, 1996).
• If not, the presence of a dissenter will break the chain of consensus and 
consequently reduce the level of influence the majority group will have on 
the target (Asch, 1951; Morris & Miller, 1975).
• This is because for informational influence to be effective, the target must 
believe that the information source is more likely to be correct than them 
(French, Garry, & Mori, 2011; Williamson, Weber, & Robertson, 
2013).Walther and colleagues suggested that a dissenter would provide the 
individual with an independent view of the event, which could resultantly 
increase the individual’s own confidence in their recollection and reduce 
their susceptibility to informational influence.
Present Study
• (H1) An increase in misinformation size (0 to 5) would increase the risk of blame 
conformity.
• (H2) The absence of a unanimous majority would significantly reduce the rates of blame 
conformity.
• The present research study wanted to determine whether the size of 
the misinformation source (1-5) had an effect on blame conformity.
• In addition, we wanted to determine whether misinformation that 
was not unanimously held could still influence the participants.
Participants and Design
288 232 
N= 608Age Range
18-82 
( M = 28.95 SD = 13.04)
Table 1. Group conditions (N=608).
Condition True participants Confederates Total Age
M Std Dev.
1 (Control) (N=174) 1 0 1 35.06 17.58
2 (N=38) 1 1 2 20.92 2.69
3 (N=94) 1 2 3 24.66 7.7
4 (N=76) 1 5 6 26.91 10.29
5 (N=56) 2 1 3 26.64 8.94
6 (N= 170) 5 1 6 28.52 10.98
• CCTV footage of a bar fight
• Lasted approximately 1.5 mins
• Two men in distinctively different 
clothing (yellow and dark green).
• Man in dark green attacks man in 
yellow.
• Both men then engage in a physical 
confrontation for forty seconds, 
before being separated.
Material
Participants were asked to watch a CCTV footage  
of a bar fight breaking out.
The groups r  llocated 2 minutes to discuss 
what they ad witnessed. No discussion was 
permitted in control group.
Participants were individually interviewed and asked 
to give a statement of what they had witnessed.  They 
were asked to identify who had thrown the first hit.  
Participants were asked not to guess and to state that 
they were uncertain if they were unsure.
METHODOLOGY: PROCEDURE
StatementDiscussionWitness
Results: Descriptive
Condition True participants Confederates Blame attribution 
Dark Top Yellow Top Uncertain
1 [Control] (N=174) 1 0 78 (44.8%) 60 (34.5%) 36 (20.7%)
2 (N=38) 1 1 14 (36.8%) 16 (42.1%) 8 (21.1%)
3 (N=94) 1 2 19 (20.2%) 61 (64.9%) 14 (14.9%)
4 (N=76) 1 5 6 (7.9%) 61 (80.3%) 9 (11.8%)
5 (N=56) 2 1 26 (46.4%) 20 (35.7%) 10 (17.9%)
6 (N= 170) 5 1 80 (47.1%) 61 (35.9%) 29 (17.1%)
• In the control group (condition one), 44.8% of participants produced a correct response, 34.5% produced an 
incorrect response, and 20.7% were uncertain, with this variance in responses suggesting the experimental 
task to be ambiguous. 
• The high number of ‘unsure’ responses suggests that the participants will have been less likely to attribute 
blame through guessing.
Table 2. Blame attribution between conditions.
Results
 Multinomial Logistic Regression was used to analyze the 
relationship between the group condition and blame attribution. 
The model fit is significant, χ² (14) = 82.59, p < .001.
 Participants from conditions three (OR=.24) and four (OR=.08), 
compared to participants in the control condition, were significantly 
more likely to produce an incorrect response than a correct 
response. The measures of association were medium to very large, 
in accordance with Cohen (1988). The effect sizes, calculated using 
Cohen’s d, were -.79 and -1.39, respectively.  
 Participants from conditions three (OR=.45) and four (OR=.28), 
compared to participants in the control condition, were also 
significantly more likely to produce an incorrect response than an 
‘uncertain’ response. The measures of association were small to 
medium, in accordance with Cohen (1988). The effect sizes, 
calculated using Cohen’s d, were -.44 and -.7, respectively.  
 Participants from condition four (OR=3.75), compared to 
participants in the control condition, were over three times more 
likely produce an ‘uncertain’ response than a correct response. The 
measure of association was medium, in accordance with Cohen 
(1988). The effect size, calculated using Cohen’s d, was .73. 
Correct response a (N=223) Unsure a (N=106) Unsure b (N=106)
Variable SE OR (95% CI) SE OR (95% CI) SE OR (95% CI)
Age .01 1 (.98/1.01) .01 1.01(.99/1.03) .02 1.02(1/1.03)
Gender
Female 1 1 1
Male .19 1.01 (.7/1.47) .27 1.33 (.78/2.27) .24 1 (.63/1.6)
Condition
1 1 1 1
2 .42 .66 (.29/1.49) .5 1.04 (.39/2.79) .51 1.58 (.59/4.28)
3 .32 .24 (.13/.44)*** .38 .45 (.21/.95)* .42 1.92 (.84/4.37)
4 .47 .08 (.03/.19)*** .42 .28 (.12/.64)** .57 3.75 (1.22/11.48)*
5 .35 .99 (.5/1.95) .45 .95 (.39/2.3) .24 1 (.63/1.6)
6 .25 1 (.62/1.62) .32 .88 (.47/1.64) .31 .88 (.49/1.6)
Table 3. Multinomial logistic regression predicting eyewitness response accuracy.
Note. a= Reference group: ‘incorrect response’ (n=279); b= Reference group: ‘correct response’ (n=223).      
OR = Odds Ratio.  SE = Standard Error. 95% CI = Confidence Interval. * p<.05. ** p<0.005. *** p<0.001
Results
• The percentage of correct, incorrect and uncertain responses 
(dependent variable) for participants who were exposed to 
misinformation from two and five confederates (independent 
variable) were compared to determine whether the change in 
misinformation size influenced response accuracy.
• A 2 (two or five confederates) X 3 (correct, incorrect or ‘unsure’ 
response) chi-square analysis was performed. A weak, significant 
association was found between the two different groups and 
eyewitness response accuracy χ2 (2, N = 170) = 6.01, p <.05, φc = .19. 
However, an examination of the standardized residuals revealed that 
the critical values did not correspond to an alpha of 0.05, suggesting 
that the difference in responses between the conditions was small. 
Discussion
• The present study found that an increase in majority size supplemented an increase in 
the rate of false responses and a decrease in the rate of correct responses, supporting 
the first hypothesis.
• It was also found that participants who were exposed to misinformation from a 
majority size of five confederates were over three times more likely to give an uncertain 
response than a correct response; suggesting that some participants were influenced 
by the confederates, despite not fully conforming to them. 
• These observations can be best explained through the frequency-validity principle, 
which proposes that eyewitnesses who are repeatedly exposed to misinformation from 
multiple co-witnesses may be more inclined to believe that the information is valid 
(Fiedler, 2000; Hertwig et al., 1997).
• The results also suggested that the rate of false responses was higher when participants 
were exposed to misinformation from five confederates than by two; however, 
additional analysis indicated that this difference was small (φc = .19). This suggests that 
the relationship between majority size and blame conformity would start to plateau 
before reaching a majority size of five (see Fig. 1).
• Asch (1952) proposed that after the addition of a third information source, the target 
would view the group as a collective source of information rather than as individual 
sources; subsequently the impact of any additional sources would be made redundant. 
Fig 1. Blame attribution between conditions.
Discussion
• The results indicate that misinformation from one confederate had no 
significant influence when there were multiple true participants present.
• Participants will have been more likely to perceive misinformation from an 
individual source as an erroneous observation; however, when presented 
with misinformation from a unanimous group of co-witnesses, participants 
would have been less likely to deem the information as being idiosyncratic 
and would have been more likely to consider the misinformation as being 
correct (Asch, 1955). 
• The presence of a dissenter would provide the individual with an 
independent view of the event, which could evoke an increase in doubt 
over the accuracy of the misinformation source and increase the 
individual’s confidence in their original report (Festinger, 1954; Walther et 
al., 2002). 
Limitations
• Unanimity of misinformation was manipulated by changing the number of 
confederates and participants. Although the inclusion of multiple 
participants was highly likely to break the chain of unanimity, this was not 
guaranteed. Participants may have still been exposed to unanimous 
misinformation if all of the other participants had erroneously presented a 
false response. Future research could use additional confederates , 
instructed to produce a correct response, to control for unanimity more 
reliably. 
• The study failed to measure the effects of co-witness influence from 
majority groups that were not unanimous (i.e. five confederates and two 
true participants/dissenters); therefore, the present study cannot 
determine whether misinformation size would still have a mediating effect 
on co-witness influence if multiple dissenters were present. 
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